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not be barred by acceptance of the benefits of the judgment
(as distinguished from a unilateral reservation by the appellant), will not preserve the right to appeal. [5] In regard
to acceptance of the benefits of the judgment as barring the
acceptor's appeal, it is said in Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202,
214 [259 P.2d 656] : "However, ' ( i) n order to bar the right
of appeal on the ground of acquiescence, "the acts relied upon
must be such as to clearly and unmistakably show acquiescence,
and it must be unconditional, voluntary, and absolute." '
(Duncan v. Duncan, 175 Cal. 693, 695 [167 P. 141] .) "
[6] And it has been held that an agreement that the acceptance of the benefits of a judgment shall not bar the right of
appeal will be recognized and preserves that right. (See
Succession of Nicholich, (IJa.App.) 167 So. 831; L1:ghtnrr v.
Board of Sttpervisors, 156 Vrwa 398 [136 N.W. 761] ; Cdy of
Srattle v. Liberman, 9 Wash. 276 [37 P. 433]; sec cases contra
169 A.L.R. 985, 1058.)
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, .J., Spence,

J., and McComb, J., concurred.

[L.A. No. 24415.
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HOY'f REED, Appellant, v. CARL 0. NORMAN et al.,
Rrspondents.
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.
-A motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judg-

ment in a stockholder's derivative action could not be sustained
on the ground that plaintiff no longer owned any stock in the
corporation because of an execution sale where his uncontradicted affidavit, filed in opposition to the motion, stated that
the execution purchaser's bid was "for and on account of"
plaintiff, and that any rights or interest in the shares sold at
execution was for plaintifr's lwncftt.
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.~- A motion
to dismiss plaintiff's appt•al fron1 an :HlVPl'S<' judgment in n
stoLokholdt·r's dPri1 a tin• nction eunld not Ia' sustain<'rl on the
gronnd that th,rn wns no showing or pl:1intit1''s <·omplianeP
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 6, 7] Corporations,§ 368; [3] Corporations, § 927; [4) Corporations, § 353; [5] Corporations, § 354.
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with
,.;tvting that nu artion slwll he "insti~
tuted or mamt1Jine1l'' unless crcrtain conditions exist, since a
.Jndgnwnt based 011 H finding tlwt su~h eonditionfi do not exist
is on the merits of thP case whieh ~hould not hP eonsid<~red on a
motion to dismiNs the appPal, hut should he determined on the
appeal itself.
[3] !d.-Taxation-Penalty for Failure to Pay Tax-Effect of Suspension.-Under Hev. & Tax. Code, §§ 23301, 23302, a corporation may not prosecute or defend an action, nor appeal from
an adverse judgment in an action, while its corporate rights
are suspended for failure to pay taxes.
[ 4] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-Generally, in a derivative action the alleged wrong is a wrong to
the corporation as such and not to the stockholders individually, and hence a har to an action by the corporation bars a
stockholders' action for the corporation.
[5] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-In a
stockholder's derivative action for a wrong to the corporation,
namely, the dissipation of corporate assets by allegedly dishonest directors and officers, while the corporate rights of the
corporation were suspended for failure to pay taxes, where the
books and records of the corporation were in the hands of the
mismanaging officers and thus the shareholders were not in a
position to make a return or compute the franchise tax it would
not be equitable to permit Hev. & Tax. Code, § 23301, relating
to nonpayment of franchise taxes, to stand as a shield for
protecting allegedly dishonest corporate officials.
[6] ld.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-In a
stockholder's derivative action for dissipation of corporate
assets by allegedly dishonest corporate officials while the corporation's corporate rights were suspended for failure to pay
taxes, plaintiff's appeal from an adverse ,judgment should not
be dismissed on the ground of such suspension where defendants had made no claim, prior to their motion to dismiss the
appeal, that the action could not proceed because of the suspension and it appeared that the records and books of the
corporation were retained by defendants, and plaintiff, assuming that he could not maintain the action because of the
suspension, should be given an opportunity of paying the
taxes and reinstating the corporation.
[7] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-In a
stockholder's derivative action for dissipation of corporate
assets by allegedly dishonest corporate officials while the cor-

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 509.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Corporations, §§ 214, 216 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Corporations, § 461 et seq.

340

REED

v.

NORMAN

[48 C.2d

poration's corporate rights were suspended for failure to pay
taxes, whether one defendant assumed complete control and
management of the corporate business to the exclusion of
plaintiff, as alleged by plaintiff, who apparently owned the
majority of the stock, may not appropriately be considered on
a motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judgment.

MOTION to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy
and Aubrey N. Irwin, Judges. Motion denied.
Hy Schwartz for Appellant.
John E. Haskins, in pro. per., and Raymond R. Roberts for
Respondents.
CARTER, J.-This litigation has been here before. It is an
action commenced in 1950 by plaintiff, a stockholder in Norman
Decorating Company, Inc., a corporation, against the corporation and Carl Norman, another stockholder, the main defendants, to contest the validity of an election of corporate directors
including Norman, to void shares issued to Norman and obtain
an accounting of corporate funds alleged to have been dissipated by Norman. Judgments against plaintiff were reversed on appeal, this court stating that the election of
directors was illegal, Norman having only 150 shares of the
500 shares whose issue was authorized. The accounting by
Norman for corporate assets was left for future determination.
(Reed v. Norman, 41 Cal.2d 17 [256 P.2d 930]; Reed v.
Norman,41 Cal.2d901 [256 P.2d 933].) Since then a further
determination has been made. The trial court sustained defendants' objection to the introduction of any evidence on
the ground that the complaint, amended complaint and supplemental complaint failed to state a cause of action and judgment
was entered that plaintiff recover nothing and defendants
"be discharged." Plaintiff now appeals from that judgment.
On the retrial resulting in the instant judgment, it appears,
and no real dispute on the subject seems to exist, that the
action is a derivative action by plaintiff, a stockholder of the
corporation, Norman Decorating Company, for a wrong to the
corporation, the dissipation by defendant directors and officers
of the corporate assets (see Gagnon Co., Inc. v. Nevada Desert
Inn, Inc., 45 Cal.2d 448 [289 P.2d 466] ; Sutter v. General
Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal.2d 525 [170 P.2d 898, 167 A.L.R.
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271]; Klopstock v. 8upcriot· Court, 17 Cal.2d 13 [108 P.2d
906, 135 A.L.R. 318] ) . The theory of the trial court in rendering the judgment now on appeal was that the action being
derivative, plaintiff was not entitled to recover because he
failed to show compliance with section 834 of the Corporations
Code.*
Norman has moved to dismiss plaintiff's appeal on the
ground that it cannot be maintained because (1) plaintiff no
longer owns any stock in the corporation, (2) there is no
showing of a compliance by plaintiff with section 834 of the
Corporations Code, supra, and (3) on January 4, 1952, the
corporation's right to engage in litigation was suspended for
failure to pay the state franchise tax under section 23301 of
the Revenue and Taxation Code. t
[1] With reference to plaintiff no longer being the owner
of any stock, it is urged that he lost his stock at execution
*"(a) No action may be instituted or maintained in the right of any
domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or of
voting trust certificates representing shares, of such corporation unless
both of the following conditions exist:
"(1) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he was a registered
shareholder or the holder of voting trust certificates at the time of the
transaction or any part thereof of which he complains or that his shares
or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon him by operation
of law from a holder who was a holder at the tin1e of the transaction
or any part thereof complained of.
"(2) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint with particularity his
efforts to secure from the board of directors such action as he desires
and alleges further that he has either informed the corporation or such
board of directors in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of
action against each defendant director or delivered to the corporation
or such board of directors a true copy of the complaint which he proposes
to file, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the
reasons for not making such effort.
"(b) In any such action, at any time within thirty days after service
of summons upon the corporation or any defendant, the corporation or
such defendant may move the conrt for an order, upon notice and hearing,
requiring the plaintiff to furnish security as hereinafter provided. Such
motion may be based upon one or more of the following grounds:
"(1) That there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution of
the canse of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party
will benefit the corporation or its secnrity holders;
"(2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not
participate in the transaction complained of in any capacity.
''The court on application of the corporation or any defendant may,
for good canse shown, extend such 30-day period for an additional period
or periods not exceeding sixty days." (Corp. Code, § 834; Hogan v.
Ingold, 38 Cal.2d 802 [243 P.2d 1, 32 A.L.R.2d 8341.)
tExcept for the purpose of amending articles of incorporation for a
new name the ''corporate powers, rights and privileges . . . shall be
suspended'' for failure to pay the franchise tax. (Rev. & 'l'ax. Code
§ 23301.)
'
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sale after the judgment from which the appeal is taken. The
theory is that the question of his right to recover for the
corporation is moot because by reason of his no longer holding
stock he no longer has any interest in the corporation or any
recovery by it. Defendant Norman in his affidavit in support
of the motion to dismiss the appeal state::; that on April 4,
1956, plaintiff Reed's stock was sold under a writ of execution
to a Marlow Baar and since then plaintiff has not been a
stockholder. He attaches to his notice of motion an exhibit
entitled "Certificate of Sale" by a marshal, but it states
therein that all of Nonnan's stock (rather than plaintiff's) was
sold to Baar. Norman has offered to have that certificate corrected. Apparently the writ was issued pending the instant
appeal on that part of the judgment on appeal which awarded
$3,768.10 costs against plaintiff and in favor of the corporation, Norman, and another defendant. Plaintiff in his noticf'
of appeal filed March 13, 1956, lists the order taxing costs
and denying plaintiff's motion to strike costs, but those orders
do not appear in the reeord and plaintiff has made no request
to augment the record. Plaintiff in his opposition to the
motion to dismiss the appeal elaims that the sale was invalid
because proper notire was not given the corporation and that
he has the rights of Baar, the purchaser at the execution sale.
Plaintiff's uncontradicted affidavit states that the bid of
Baar, the execution purchaser, was "for and on account of"
plaintiff ''and that any rights or any interest in said shares
[sold at execution] by reason of said bid is for the benefit
of" plaintiff "and that he is the beneficial owner of any
such interest and rights." It is thus clear that plaintiff has
not lost his title to the stock and hence the motion to dismiss
is not sustainable on that ground. For that reason we need
not and do not pass upon the validity of the sale or whether,
if valid, it would render the appeal moot.
[2] As to the question of failure to comply with section
884 of the Corporations Code, S1tpra, the case falls within tl1e
general rule that the merits of a case should not be considerf'd
on a motion to dismiss the appeal; it should be determined on
the appeal itself. (Estate of Wnnderlc, 30 Cal.2d 274 [181
P.2d 87 41, and cases cited.) It iR trne that section 834 states
that no aetion shall be '' institnted or maintained'' unles,;
<·t~rtain eolHlitions exist and the eomplaint mnst show whether
or not those eonditiow; <•xist. A finding that thPy do not may
result in a dismissal of the action, and a judgment based upon
such a finding is on the merits of that phase of the case
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and is l'<'\'iewnbl<~ on appeal til!~ ;.:amr <!c; illl,Y ntiJpr judgment
of rhsmis~aL The rpwstjon ii' 11·hether tlw trial ro1ut. was
correct ill d'•ti'J'll1ining b,\' its jndgmr>nl that ti!Py rlid not PXist.
[3, 4] On the isstw of cmspem;ion of the eorporation for
failure to pay fraueh ise tax, it is true that under the corporation law (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 23301, 23302, supra) the corporation may not prosecute or defend an action, nor appeal
f1·om au adverse judgmellt in an action while its corporate
rights are suspended for failure to pay taxes (Boyle v. Lakeview Creamery Co., 9 Cal.2d 16 [68 P.2d 968]; Ocean Park
etc. Co. v. Pacijic Auto Park Co., 37 Cal.App.2d J58 [98 P.2d
1068] ; Baker v. F'errel, 78 Cai.App.2d 578 [177 P.2d 973];
Fidelity Metals Corp. v. Risley, 77 Cai.App.2d 377 [175 P.2d
592]), and, generally, in a rlrrivative aetion the wrong is "to
the corporation as such and not the stoekholders individually,
hem~e a bar to an action by the stockholders for the corporation." (Gagnon Co., Inc. v. Nevada Desert Inn, Inc., supra,
45 Cal.2d 448, 453.) [5] But here, in a stockholders' derivative aetion, the corporation is forced to be a party because
any recovery goes through the corporate channel and thus
enhanees the stockholders' interest therein. 'l'he corporation
is not attempting to e:xereise its rights as a eorporation. It is
being used as a JWrr>ssary rhannPl hy the shareholders. The
books and rreords of the eorporation arc in the hands of the
mismanaging officers aceonling to plaintiff's complaints and
thus the shareholders are not in a position to make a return
or compute the franchise tax. In such a case it is not equitable
to permit section 23301 of the Reyenue and Taxation Code to
stand as a shield for protecting allegedly dishonest corporate
officials. The corporation is not enjoying any of the privileges
aceorded to such entities; it is more analogous to the winding
np of the business. In Weinert v. Kinkel, 296 N.Y. 151 [71
N.E.2d 445, 446], the stockholders' derivative action was for
breach of fiduciary duty of direetors to the eorporation. The
action was commenced after the eorporation had been "dissolved for nonpayment of taxes,'' yrt the court held the corporation vvas not an indispensable party, stating: ''The technieal argnment made by appellants disregards l'E'alities and
should not prrvail. Tt has been reeognized that the court may
dispense with the presenee of a defunct corporation in a
derivative action, if the circumstances warrant such exercise of
its equitable powers. Cohen v. Dana, 287 N.Y. 405, 410, 411
r40 N.E.2d 227, 2301; N Ol'man v. General American Transp.
0orp., 181 Mis<·. 2~:i f47 N.Y.S.2d 390], affirmed 267 App.
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Div. 758 [45 N.Y.S.2d 929]; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 238 Mass.
403 [131 N.E. 177]; 13 Fletcher on Corporations, § 5997.
Such circumstances are here present. As observed by the
learned referee, the defendant directors dominated and controlled the board; they were residents of New York; the
corporation's business was clone here; and, as provided by the
by-laws and authorized by the certificate of incorporation, the
corporate meetings were held in this State. Beyond that,
the fictitious corporate person disappeared upon dissolution,
and whatever assets it might have had at that time belonged
thereafter, in equity at least, to the stockholders who are thus
the equitable owners of this claim against defendants. Hence,
as the referee remarked, 'the presence of a representative of
the artificial person would add no material element to the
litigation.'" (See Carruthers v. Jack Waite Mining Co.,
306 N.Y. 136 [116 N.E.2cl 286] ; 172 A.L.R. 691.) Smith v.
Lewis, 211 Cal. 294 [295 P. 37], states a contrary rule but
there it does not appear that the records and books of the
corporation were in the hands of the defaulting corporate
officers and unavailable to the shareholder.
[6] For another reason the appeal should not be dismissed
on the last mentioned ground. Although the corporation was
suspended for nonpayment of taxes January 4, 1952, the former appeal was decided on May 12, 1953, and the judgment
herein was entered on January 24, 1956, defendants have at
no time until the present motion to dismiss the appeal made
any claim that the action could not proceed because of the
suspension and it appears that the records and books of the
corporation have been retained by defendants. It would thus
seem that plaintiff, even assuming he could not maintain the
action because of the suspension, should be given an opportunity of paying the taxes and reinstating the corporation.*
[7] Under the holding in the former decisions in this case
( 41 Cal.2d 17; 41 Cal.2d 901) Norman was the legal owner
·«'Any taxpayer which has suffered the suspension or forfeiture pro·
vided for in Section 23301 may be relieved therefrom upon making
application therefore in writing to the Franchise Tax Board and upon
payment of the tax and the interest and penalties for nonpayment of
which the suspension or forfeiture occurred, together with all other taxes,
deficiencies, interest and penalties due under this part, and upon the
issuance by the Franchise Tax Board of a certificate of revivor. Application for such certificate on behalf of any domestic bank or corporation
which has suffered such suspension may be made by any stockholder or
creditor or by a majority of the surviving trustees or directors thereof;
application for such certificate may be made by any foreign bank or
corporation which has suffered such forfeiture or by any stockholder or
creditor thereof." (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 23305.)
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of only 150 shares of the corporation here involved and Reed
was the legal owner of 245 shares ( 41 Cal.2d 17). By virtue
of this situation Norman now contends that Reed could have
assumed control of the corporation and has no right to bring
a derivative action (see Jones v. Rc-JJ1ine Oil Co., 47 Cal.App.
2d 832 [119 P.2d 219]) but this contention may not now be
considered as it does not appear that plaintiff has assumed
control of the corporation and he alleges that the defendants
have control of all the books and records of the corporation.
Although he may own the majority of the stock by reason of
the holding above mentioned, he has alleged and maintained
throughout this litigation that Norman has assumed complete
control and management of the business of the corporation
to the exclusion of plaintiff. That is a matter that should be
addressed to the trial court; it may not appropriately be
considered on a motion to dismiss the appeal.
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5939.

In Bank.

Apr. 12, 1957.]

THE PEOPLE Respondent, v. nA.VID J. HARDENBROOK, Appellant.
[1] Witnesses- Corroboration- Prior Consistent Statements. -

Where the opposition has assailed the testimony of a witness
as being of recent fabrication, an exception to the hearsay rule
allows the admission of evidence of statements or conduct
prior to the claimed fabrication and consistent with the testimony of the witness at the trial, not to prove the facts of the
case, but as tending· to show that the witness has not been
[1] Admissibility for purpose of supporting impeached witness,
of prior statements by him consistent with his testimony, note, 140
A.L.R. 21. See also Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 153; Am.Jur., Witnesses,
§ 817 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Witnesses, ~ 280; [3] Homicide,
§58; [4] Homicide,§ 62; [5] Criminal Law,§ 1404(14); [6] Criminal Law, § 1407(6); [7] Criminal Law, § 1404(12); [8] Criminal
Law, § 1404(13); [9] Criminal Law, § 1092.

